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Abstract 
 
This year will mark the tenth anniversary of the commencement of the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007.  The Act was significant in that it 
introduced a specific offence for corporate killing in the United Kingdom for the first 
time. Such reform was generally welcomed, yet many academics and practitioners 
were critical of what they perceived to be the Act’s unnecessary complexity and 
questioned how effective it would be.  The Grenfell Tower fire has recently 
stimulated renewed debate about corporate manslaughter and the ability of the law 
to hold organisations and individuals to account. To engage meaningfully in this 
discourse, it is imperative to review the Act’s performance in practice over the last 
ten years.  The author offers an original contribution to knowledge in this area 
through: (i) fresh analysis of whether the criticism ten years ago has proved to be 
well-founded; (ii) scrutiny of the extent to which the Act has been successful in 
meeting its stated aims; (iii) critique of the judicial precepts in this area; and (iv) new 
insights into the future of corporate manslaughter including how the Act could be 
more efficacious. 
The statutory corporate manslaughter offence affords a superior basis of liability to 
the unwieldy common law offence that preceded it; there have been more 
prosecutions, higher average fines and its reach encompasses more than just 
micro/small companies. Conversely, the Act is simultaneously a disappointing 
compromise; fewer prosecutions than predicted, unjustifiable inconsistency in 
sentencing, a continued lack of individual accountability and a prosecutory 
preoccupation with a limited range of defendant. The introduction of new sentencing 
guidelines and recent case law developments, including the first fine measured in 
the millions of pounds, signal progress and have gone some way to address these 
inadequacies. Despite this, it is questionable whether the Act can rise to the 
challenge of securing convictions in relation to Grenfell Tower and similar factually 
complex tragedies. In order to fully capture and prevent the wide range of deaths 
within the Act’s remit, it is clear that prosecutors need enhanced training and a 
willingness to embrace a holistic reconceptualisation of ‘offender’. 
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Introduction 
This year will mark the tenth anniversary of the commencement of the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (the ‘Act’). 1   The Act was 
significant in that it introduced a specific offence for corporate killing in the United 
Kingdom (‘UK’) for the first time.2 The Act was generally welcomed at its inception3, 
yet many experts were critical of what they perceived to be the Act’s unnecessary 
complexity.  A significant body of academic literature was produced in this period 
which collectively subscribed to the view that the Act would be a failure, doomed by 
its own ‘layers of technicality’.4  The Grenfell Tower fire has recently engrossed the 
public and stimulated renewed debate about corporate manslaughter and the ability 
of the law to hold organisations and individuals to account. 5  To engage 
meaningfully in this discourse, it is imperative to review the Act’s performance in 
practice over the last ten years.  During this period, a number of updating pieces 
have been published, although these have generally been short, or at most, 
medium length articles which have tended to focus on case law developments and 
sentencing.6 These contributions to the debate have not referred back in detail to 
the initial criticisms of the Act in their analysis and the commentary has focused on 
the lack of convictions, and the absence of prosecutions of large companies. 
General critiques have provided a brief overview of the cases in this area, albeit 
there is scope for in depth discussion. Recent developments warrant detailed 
                                                          
1  The Act received Royal Assent on 26 July 2007 and came into force on 6 April 2008 
save for s. 2(1)(d) and s.10.   S. (2)(1)(d) (duty of care owed to a person in custody) came 
into force on 1 September 2011 and s.10 (power to order conviction, etc. to be publicised) 
came into force on 15 February 2010.  
2 In England, Wales and Northern Ireland the offence is known as ‘corporate 
manslaughter’ and in Scotland it is known as ‘corporate homicide’ – The corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, s. 1(5).  
3 The House of Commons Home Affairs and Work and Pensions Committees reported 
that a new basis for liability was supported by the majority of respondents. See the House 
of Commons Home Affairs and Work and Pensions Committees, Draft Corporate 
Manslaughter Bill, First Joint Report of Session 2005-2006, Volume 1: Report, HC 540-I 
(2005), para. 13 and 14. 
4 D. Ormerod and R. Taylor, 'The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 
2007' (2008) Criminal Law Review 589 at 590. 
5 The Grenfell Tower fire broke out on 14 June 2017 in a public housing tower block in 
west London. At the time of writing up to 80 people are estimated to have died in the 
blaze. See https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/sep/19/grenfell-tower-inquiry-may-
consider-individual-manslaughter-charges (accessed 25 September 2017).  
6 See for example: S.F. Jones and L. Field, 'Are directors getting away with 
manslaughter? Emerging trends in prosecutions for corporate manslaughter' (2014) 
Business Law Review 158; C. Wells 'Corporate criminal liability: a ten year review' (2014) 
Criminal Law Review 849; J. Grimes. ‘Corporate Manslaughter (2012) Law Society 
Gazette 29 Aug 2012; G Slapper, 'Justice is mocked if an important law is unenforced' 
(2013) 77 Journal of Criminal Law 91; N. Davies, ‘Sentencing guidance: Corporate 
Manslaughter and Health and Safety Offences Causing Death - Maintaining the Status 
Quo?’ [2010] 5 Criminal Law Review 402; G. Slapper, 'Corporate punishment' (2010) 74 
Journal of Criminal Law 181; L. Field and S.F. Jones, ‘The Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act 2007 and the sentencing guidelines for corporate manslaughter: 
more bark than bite?’ (2015) 36The Company Lawyer 327 at 330; G. Forlin, 'The 
Sentencing Council consultation document relating to health and safety offences, 
corporate manslaughter and food safety and hygiene offence guidelines: "up up and 
away"!' (2015)1 Archbold Review 6.  
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critique: seven companies have now been sentenced under new sentencing 
guidelines, and in July 2017 the first fine in excess of £1 million was imposed in a 
corporate manslaughter case.  In short, there is a need for a more pervasive 
deconstruction of this important area, providing a comprehensive analysis of the 
extant law. The majority of corporate manslaughter cases are unreported in the law 
reports and there is a requirement for a de novo reconceptualisation in this area. 
The author offers an original contribution to knowledge through: (i) fresh analysis 
of whether the criticism ten years ago has proved to be well-founded; (ii) scrutiny 
of the extent to which the Act has been successful in meeting its stated aims; (iii) 
critique of the judicial precepts in this area; and (iv) new insights into the future of 
corporate manslaughter, including how the Act could be more efficacious. The 
article is divided into five main sections.  
The first section considers how the common law developed in relation to corporate 
manslaughter in the years before the Act, something crucial to appreciate the 
context in which the new offence was introduced. The reasons why the common 
law offence of gross negligence manslaughter was considered ineffective are 
explored.  The lack of prosecutions in this period is also discussed, as are the social 
impetuses that led to strong support for reform. The second section discusses the 
explicit aims of the Act by reference to the relevant regulatory impact assessment 
and the notes accompanying the Bill.  The primary purpose of the new offence was 
to overcome the problems that had plagued common law corporate manslaughter 
prosecutions. It was hoped that this would increase the number of convictions for 
corporate manslaughter, in turn acting as a stronger deterrent to lax health and 
safety practices. The third section goes on to analyse the elements of the offence 
itself and the way in which it was, at least in theory, designed to overcome the 
problems encountered with the common law offence. The fourth section builds upon 
this enquiry by examining how radical the Act was, by reference to the debates 
which raged on its introduction.  Crucially, consideration is also given to what 
extent, if at all, the criticism of the Act has proved to be well-founded. The final 
section provides a de novo review of the cases to date by deconstructing their 
outcomes in terms of commonalities and identifiable trends. The conclusion draws 
together the threads of analysis running throughout the article and summarises the 
author’s conclusions in relation to points (i) to (iv) noted above. In precis, the main 
new insights are as follows.  
Establishment of duty of care precepts and the senior management test have not 
operated as bulwarks against securing successful prosecutions. The inclusion of a 
senior management element to the offence is preferable to the identification 
doctrine, although it no doubt limits the number of prosecutions that are brought.  
The opaqueness of the senior management test has potentially been clarified by 
comments in the case of Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust7, statements 
which appear to have been largely overlooked, presumably because no conviction 
was ultimately secured in the case. The senior management test is a fudged 
compromise, the same is true of the Act more generally. It aimed to make it easier 
to secure convictions and create a level playing field for small, medium and large 
                                                          
7 R v Dr Errol Cornish and Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust [2015] EWHC 2967 
(QB). 
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organisations. The Act has made advances in both respects, and while only one 
large company has been successfully prosecuted, a new insight is that there has 
at times been a misdirected focus on the importance of prosecuting large 
companies under the Act. Health and safety statistics suggest that large companies 
are responsible for relatively few fatalities and that it is reasonable to expect the 
majority of prosecutions should be of small or medium companies.  It is now easier 
to secure prosecutions under the Act, higher average fines are imposed and a wider 
spectrum of liability has been established in terms of company size. The issue is 
that conviction rates consistently fall short of what was predicted, there has been 
beguiling obfuscation in corporate manslaughter sentencing, and a trend of 
continued individual liability avoidance. Disappointingly, a palpable nexus has been 
revealed between a defendant’s ability to pay and the level of fine in a case. Early 
indications suggest that the new sentencing guidelines will mark a significant step 
forward, reflecting apposite culpability and corporate blameworthiness. A trend of 
increased appetite for holding directors to account along with their companies can 
also be observed in recent cases. If the Act is to realise its full potential in capturing 
and preventing unlawful health and safety practices though, there needs to be a 
holistic reconceptualisation of ‘offender’ beyond companies to the wide range of 
organisations which already fall within the Act’s remit. There is clearly a need for 
enhanced training of investigatory and prosecutor teams if prosecutions are to be 
pursued in all appropriate cases.  Publicity orders should be routinely imposed in 
every case to ensure that reporting is balanced, factually accurate and not 
misleading in any way.  
Preserving lives is as important today as it was ten years ago.  MP David Lammy 
has labelled the Grenfell Tower fire as ‘corporate manslaughter’ and called for 
arrests to be made.8  In July 2017 the Scotland Yard investigation into the disaster 
said there were “reasonable grounds” to suspect the Royal Borough of Kensington 
and Chelsea Council and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation, the 
organisation that managed the tower block, of corporate manslaughter.9  Individual 
charges were also announced as a possibility in September 2017.10 Despite the Act 
being more effective than the common law which preceded it, there are significant 
potential barriers to any corporate manslaughter convictions being secured. Only a 
few months ago Southwark Council was convicted of four breaches of fire safety 
regulations in relation to a fire in 2009 at another tower block in London, Lakanal 
House.11 Despite 6 people dying in the blaze and a number of similarities to Grenfell, 
corporate manslaughter charges were not even pursued.12 Grenfell, is a disaster 
                                                          
8 See http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/grenfell-tower-fire-corporate-
manslaughter-arrests-david-lammy-mp-labour-london-kensington-a7790911.html 
(accessed 20 June 2017).  
9 See https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jul/27/met-says-grenfell-council-may-
have-committed-corporate-manslaughter (accessed 25 September 2017).  
10 See https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/sep/19/grenfell-tower-inquiry-may-
consider-individual-manslaughter-charges (accessed 25 September 2017).  
11 See https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/feb/28/southwark-council-fined-570000-
over-fatal-tower-block-fire (accessed 25 September 2017).  
12 For discussion of the similarities between the Grenfell Tower and the Lakanal House 
fire, see: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/commentisfree/2017/jun/19/grenfell-
tower-lakanal-house-inquest-fire-safety (accessed 4 October 2017).  
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on an entirely different scale to Lakanal: up to 80 people died, the criminal 
investigation has seized 31 million documents and has identified 336 companies 
and organisations linked to the construction, refurbishment and management of the 
tower.13  Despite the Act being introduced in part as a response to large scale 
disasters exactly like this, it is not clear that moral indignation will ultimately triumph 
over all the potential barriers to conviction. The Act represents progress but not 
perfection.  
 
The Untenable Position Prior to the Act 
Before the Act’s introduction, there was no specific corporate manslaughter 
offence. Individuals could be charged with the common law offence of gross 
negligence manslaughter14, and it was established in 1991 for the first time that a 
company could also be charged with that offence. 15  Securing successful 
prosecutions proved to be very difficult, and this was mainly attributed to issues 
with what is termed the ‘identification doctrine’.16 A company, like a person, has a 
legal personality which means it is regarded in law as separate from the people 
who own it and it can do various things in its own right e.g. hold property, sue and 
be sued etc.  This is a convenient from a legal perspective, notwithstanding in 
practice companies can only act through human agents. In order to successfully 
convict a company of corporate manslaughter, the prosecution had to convince the 
court that the actions of a specific, culpable, individual within the company’s 
hierarchy should be ‘attributed’ to the company i.e. that they could be ‘identified as 
the embodiment of the company itself’.17  The court had to be satisfied that a person 
sufficiently senior in the company’s organisational structure was themselves guilty 
of gross negligence manslaughter and only then would the guilt of the individual in 
turn establish the guilt of the company.18  This was particularly problematic in 
respect of large companies because the more complex a management structure 
was, the more difficult it was to identify a person with specific responsibility for 
health and safety matters.19 The problem was exacerbated by the fact the courts 
refused to aggregate the actions of a number of individuals within a corporate 
structure in order to establish liability.20   
                                                          
13See https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/sep/19/grenfell-tower-inquiry-may-
consider-individual-manslaughter-charges (accessed 25 September 2017).  
14  The leading House of Lord’s case on gross negligence manslaughter is R v Adomako 
[1995] 1 AC 171. 
15 P &O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd (1991) 93 Cr App Rep 72. See discussion in C. 
Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press: 2001) 
106 of earlier attempts to prosecute companies for corporate manslaughter.  
16 The first case in which the identification doctrine was clearly recognised in the criminal 
law was DPP v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd [1944] KB 146. 
17 See discussion in Home Office, Reforming the Law on Involuntary Manslaughter: The 
Government's Proposals, (2000) at para. 3.1.3. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid. at para 3.1.4. 
20 A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1999) [2000] QB 796. 
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It was recognised that the application of the identification doctrine made 
prosecutions of large companies for manslaughter ‘almost impossible’.21  As a 
result, charges were more commonly brought under health and safety legislation, 
where they were brought at all.22 When the House of Commons Home Affairs and 
Work and Pensions Committees (the ‘Joint Committee’) scrutinised the draft 
corporate manslaughter Bill in 2005, it noted that since 1992 there had only been 
seven work-related corporate manslaughter convictions all of which were of small 
organisations or sole traders.23 For example, two of the cases commonly cited, Kite 
and others24 and Jackson Transport (Ossett) Ltd25, involved one-person companies 
and, therefore, as Wells articulated, did not ‘provide the challenge that the large 
modern corporation brings to criminal law’.26   
Pressure for reform mounted in the late 1980s and 1990s. A lack of prosecutions 
in relation to a series of high profile disasters left the public with the impression that 
the common law was not delivering justice.27 Incidents like the Herald of Free 
Enterprise 28 , and the Southall rail crash 29 , led to fatalities yet no corporate 
convictions were secured despite inquiries indicating corporate fault. 30  It was 
acknowledged that the UK generally had a strong health and safety track record 
albeit concern was expressed about the ‘unacceptably high’31 levels of workplace 
deaths, particularly in factories, and on building sites32. Such incidents had often 
been labelled as ‘accidents’, suggesting nobody was to blame when in fact many 
were attributable to health and safety failings.33  The Health and Safety Executive 
(‘HSE’) was of the view that the majority of these deaths could have been 
prevented.34  
The idea of reform was first mooted in 199435 , and two years later the Law 
Commission outlined its proposals on ‘corporate killing’, and published a draft bill 
                                                          
21 See House of Commons Home Affairs and Work and Pensions Committees, above n. 3 
at p.3.  
22 C.M.V Clarkson, 'Corporate manslaughter: yet more Government proposals' (2005) 
Criminal Law Review 677 at 678.  
23 Above n. 3 at para. 11.  
24 R v Kite and others. (1994) The Independent 9 December. 
25 R v Jackson Transport (Ossett) Ltd (1996) (unreported). See Health and Safety at Work 
November 1996 at 4. 
26 See Wells, above n.15 at 107. 
27 Home Office, Corporate Manslaughter: The Government’s Draft Bill for Reform, (2005) 
para. 10. 
28 The Herald of the Free Enterprise was a ferry that capsized in 1987 with a death toll of 
193.  A prosecution of the company failed as negligence could not be attributed to anyone 
who could be identified as the directing mind of the company.  
29 The Southall rail crash occurred in 1997 and led to seven deaths. Great Western Trains 
pleaded guilty to a health and safety offence but the judge ruled a charge of corporate 
manslaughter could not succeed because of the need to apply the identification doctrine.  
30 See Home Office, above n. 17 at para. 3.1.5. 
31 See Home Office, above n. 27 at para. 6.  
32 See discussion of the need for reform by Home Office, above n. 17 at para. 3.1.5. 
33 See further detailed discussion by Wells, above n. 15 at 121-122. 
34 See Home Office, above n. 27 at para. 6. 
35 Law Commission, Involuntary Manslaughter. A Consultation Paper, Cm 135 (1994). The 
Law Commission invited comments on its proposals to create a separate manslaughter 
offence for corporations.  
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on involuntary manslaughter36. Progress was slow, and it was not until the year 
2000 that the Home Office responded to the Law Commission’s proposals, 
acknowledging that the law relating to involuntary corporate killing was in need of 
‘radical reform’.37 Further delays ensued though, and it was 2005 before a specific 
corporate manslaughter Bill was published in draft (the ‘Bill).38 A further round of 
consultation followed the publication of the Bill, and amendments to the Bill were 
proposed and debated as it moved through Parliament.  The Act finally received 
Royal Assent in 2007. Therefore, the Act is not a piece of legislation borne of haste, 
and hurriedly implemented. Rather, as Gobert notes, it was subject to a lengthy 
process of consultation and examination over a period of 13 years.39 With such a 
long period in development, it is reasonable to have had high hopes for what the 
Act would achieve. In reality, the Act was a compromise, many of its aims were 
actually quite modest, and others, such as its deterrent effect, difficult to quantify.  
 
The Aims of the Act  
The principal aims of the Act were to replace the common law offence with a 
corporate manslaughter offence that was more effective in prosecuting companies 
and other organisations40, and to act as a stronger deterrent against poor health 
and safety practices41. It was hoped that the new offence would overcome many of 
the issues that has previously been presented by the application of the identification 
doctrine, thus making it easier to prosecute large companies, and thereby creating 
a level playing field for small, medium and large enterprises.42    The Regulatory 
Impact Assessment for the Act estimated that the new offence would lead to an 
additional 10-13 corporate manslaughter prosecutions per year. 43   It states 
‘prosecutions’ as opposed to ‘convictions’ although it seems logical to infer that the 
government envisaged the substantial majority, if not all, of those additional 
prosecutions would result in a conviction. Before the Act there were often years 
where no corporate manslaughter cases were prosecuted. In reality, the Regulatory 
Impact Assessment was suggesting the total number of cases each year would be 
in the region of 10-13. Given that there were 247 workplace deaths in 2006/200744, 
                                                          
36 Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter: Item 11 of 
the Sixth Programme of Law Reform: Criminal Law, Cm 237 (1996).  This report covered 
involuntary manslaughter generally and was not just limited to corporate manslaughter 
specifically.  
37 Above n. 15 at 3. The statement related not just to corporate manslaughter but to 
involuntary manslaughter generally.  
38 See Home Office, above n. 27.  
39 J. Gobert, 'The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 – Thirteen 
years in the making but was it worth the wait?' (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 413 at 420. 
40 See Home Office, above n. 27 at para.5. 
41 See Home Office, above n. 27 at para. 6.  
42 Home Office, Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide: A Regulatory Impact 
Assessment on the Government’s Bill (2006) available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/ria-
corporate-manslaughter.pdf?view=Binary (accessed 6 April 2017).  
43 Ibid. at para. 25. See also House of Commons, Explanatory Notes to the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill, (2006) at para. 69.  
44 See http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/overall/hssh0708.pdf (accessed 22 June 2017).  
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and that the Act does not just apply to worker deaths, this prediction appears timid 
rather than tough.   The Act is intended to complement rather than replace health 
and safety law, and companies can still be charged with health and safety offences 
in addition or alternatively to a charge of corporate manslaughter45. It was hoped 
that the threat of a corporate manslaughter charge, as opposed to ‘just’ a health 
and safety charge, would present ‘increased reputational risks’ for corporations, 
and thereby act as a greater deterrent to lax health and safety practices.46 
The Act’s ambition was not only to achieve an increase in prosecutions for 
corporate manslaughter, it also sought to send a strong message about the value 
placed on preserving human life. Gobert, whilst highly critical of a number of 
aspects of the Act, argued that its ‘symbolic significance may ultimately transcend 
its methodological deficiencies’.47 He noted that the Act would send a message that 
companies are not above the law and that corporate manslaughter is not just a 
technical regulatory offence, it is a ‘real’ crime.48 Indeed commentators like Griffin 
have declared that family members of victims might feel justice had been better 
served if a specific charge of corporate manslaughter was brought against the 
organisation that caused their loved one’s death, rather than just a health and safety 
prosecution.49 Health and safety offences are seen as technical rather than moral 
in nature, imposing liability for the exposure of persons to risk as opposed to 
imposing liability for any specific harm caused.50 Almond is of the view that health 
and safety offences are not regarded as real crimes: ‘regulatory…law…is rarely, if 
ever, perceived as constituting a meaningful form of criminal law’.51 Before the new 
offence came into force, companies that caused a person’s death could have faced 
an unlimited fine under health and safety legislation. Following the introduction of 
the Act, the primary sanction remains the same, an unlimited fine. Now however, 
the corporate offender may be charged with the offence of corporate manslaughter, 
an offence which has graver connotations and is more ‘fairly labelled’ as Clarkson 
has iterated.52  
 
The Corporate Manslaughter Offence 
The Act abolished the common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter in so 
far as it applies to corporations and other organisations falling within the scope of 
                                                          
45 The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, s. 19. For example, 
sections 2-3 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 impose a statutory duty to 
ensure that employees and other persons are not exposed to a risk to their health or 
safety.  
46 L. Trevelyan, 'Fatally flawed?' (2005) Law Society Gazette 6 May 2005. 
47 Above n. 39 at 414.  
48 Ibid. at 431.  
49  S. Griffin 'Corporate manslaughter: a radical reform?' (2007) 71 Journal of Criminal Law 
151. See also Gobert, above at n. 39 and Trevelyn, above at n. 46. 
50 P. Almond, P. and R. Arthur ‘Imposing criminal liability onto employers for work-related 
death: the UK experience’ (2013) International labor brief, 11 (10). pp. 44-59. 
51 P. Almond and S.  Colover ‘Communication and social regulation. The criminalization of 
work-related death’ British Journal of Criminology  (2012) 52 (5). pp. 997-1016 at 998.  
52 Above n. 22 at 688.  
9 
 
the Act53, and created a new specific offence54. The offence does not apply to 
individuals (e.g. company directors or managers) and, quite controversially, an 
individual cannot be convicted of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the 
commission of the offence.55 An ‘organisation is defined in the Act as a corporation 
(e.g. a company) 56, a police force57, certain government departments and Crown 
bodies listed in a schedule 58  and some unincorporated bodies (such as 
partnerships) where they are an employer59.  
Section 1(1) of the Act sets out the elements of the offence:  
 An organisation to which this section applies is guilty of an offence 
if the way in which its activities are managed or organised 
(a)   causes a person's death, and (b)   amounts to a gross breach of 
a relevant duty of care owed by the organisation to the deceased. 
Section 1(3) caveats this by going on to state that an organisation is only guilty of 
an offence ‘if the way in which its activities are managed or organised by its senior 
management is a substantial element in the breach referred to in subsection (1)’. 
The Act defines senior management as persons who play significant roles in the 
making of decisions about how the whole or a substantial part of its activities are to 
be managed or organised, or the actual managing or organising of the whole or a 
substantial part of those activities.60  
No new duties of care are created by the Act and whether a duty exists is a question 
of law for the judge. 61  Relevant existing duties under the law of negligence are 
listed and these include: a duty owed to employees or other workers; a duty owed 
as an occupier of premises; a duty owed in connection with construction or 
maintenance operations and a duty owed in connection with any other commercial 
activity.62 The new offence was aimed at the most serious management failings 
deserving of criminal sanction, which is why it requires any breach to be gross.63 In 
considering whether a gross breach occurred the jury must consider whether the 
evidence shows that the organisation failed to comply with any health and safety 
legislation that relates to the alleged breach, and if so how serious that failure was 
and how much of a risk of death it posed.64 In addition, the jury may also consider 
the extent to which the evidence shows that there were attitudes, policies, systems 
or accepted practices within the organisation that were likely to have encouraged 
any such failure, or to have produced tolerance of it and have regard to any health 
                                                          
53 The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, s. 20. 
54 Ibid. s. 1.  
55 Ibid. s. 18. 
56 For the purposes of the Act a corporation does not include a corporation sole but 
includes any body corporate wherever incorporated. Ibid. s. 25. 
57 Ibid. s. 1(2)(b). 
58 Ibid. Schedule 1.  
59 Ibid. s. 1(2).  
60 Ibid. s. 1(4)(c).  
61 Ibid. s. 2(5). The judge must make any findings of fact necessary to decide this 
question.  
62 Ibid. s. 2(1).  
63 See Home Office, above n. 27 at para. 32. 
64 The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, s. 8 (2).  
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and safety guidance that relates to the alleged breach.65 Any other matters the jury 
believe are relevant may also be taken into account.66  Jurisdiction wise, the Act 
applies where the harm causing death is sustained in the UK or other places where 
the jurisdiction of the UK extends.67 It is only possible to bring a prosecution with 
the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions (for either England and Wales or 
Northern Ireland as relevant). 68 
In summary, to bring a successful prosecution: 
• the prosecution must be brought against an ‘organisation’ which falls within 
the definition in the Act with the consent of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions;  
• the organisation must have owed a duty of care to the deceased (this is a 
question of law for the judge); 
• there must have been a gross breach of the duty of care as a result of the 
way the organisation’s activities were managed or organised (this is a 
question of fact for the jury69); 
• the way in which the organisation’s activities were managed or organised 
by its senior management must have been a substantial element in the 
breach (also a question of fact for the jury70); 
• this caused the deceased to die (the usual principles of causation in criminal 
law apply71); and 
• the harm causing the death was sustained in the UK or some other place 
subject to the UK’s jurisdiction.     
 
The offence is only triable on indictment and if an organisation is found guilty of the 
offence the main sanction has always been a fine. 72  Other, more extreme, 
remedies such as corporate ‘death sentences’ (i.e. orders for compulsory 
dissolution) were ultimately rejected. Sentencing guidelines for corporate 
manslaughter came into effect in 2010 (the ‘Original Sentencing Guidelines’)73, later 
replaced by updated sentencing guidelines from 1 February 2016 (the ‘New 
Sentencing Guidelines’) 74 . The New Sentencing Guidelines were formulated 
following criticism of the judicial approach to sentencing in corporate manslaughter 
cases and are discussed in detail below.  In addition to a fine, a court can impose 
                                                          
65 Ibid. s. 8 (3). 
66 Ibid. s. 8 (4).  
67 Ibid. s. 28. For example, a British-controlled aircraft or ship.  
68 Ibid. s. 17.  
69 Ibid. s. 8(1)(b).  
70 Whether a gross breach has occurred is a question of fact for the jury and accordingly 
the jury in making its decision will be required to consider whether the senior management 
played a substantial role in such breach.  
71 See Ormerod and Taylor, above n. 4 at 605. 
72 The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, s. 1(6).  
73 Sentencing Guidelines Council, Corporate Manslaughter & Health and Safety Offences 
Causing Death Definitive Guideline (2010).  
74 Sentencing Council, Health and Safety Offences, Corporate Manslaughter and Food 
Safety and Hygiene Offences Definitive Guideline (2016).  
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a remedial order requiring the organisation to take specified steps to remedy the 
breach which led to the death(s)75 and/or a publicity order requiring it to publicise 
details of the conviction in a specified manner76.  A conviction will also generally 
lead to a prosecution costs order being made against the organisation and such 
costs may be considerable, particularly where the defendant has pleaded not guilty 
and a trial has been held.77  
 
Radical reform or modest in extent?  
On the face of it, the introduction of a specific statutory offence for corporate 
manslaughter, and the abandonment of the troublesome identification doctrine, 
appears to have been a radical revision of the law.78  If we analyse the Act in further 
detail the reform has arguably been more modest than it would first appear.79 A 
range of criticisms were directed at the Act before and on its introduction, focusing 
on the offence’s ‘ambiguities’ and ‘undue complexities’. 80  When the Joint 
Committee scrutinised the Bill it condemned various aspects of the proposed 
offence including the emphasis placed on senior management, the requirement for 
a duty of care and the exclusion of individual liability. 81  Some of the Joint 
Committee’s recommendations were subsequently accepted by the government, 
many were simply rejected leading to a less radical reform than many had hoped 
for.82  Each area of criticism levelled at the Act will be analysed sequentially to see 
if it has proved to be well-founded.  
 
The slippery concept of senior management 
As noted above, an organisation’s senior management must play a substantial role 
in the breach of duty leading to death. The senior management ‘test’ as it has often 
been described became the most heavily criticised aspects of the Bill, and later the 
Act.83 One of the intentions of the statutory offence was to overcome issues caused 
by the identification doctrine, nonetheless the inclusion of a senior management 
requirement was justified by the Home Office on the basis that the offence was 
intended to target strategic management failings rather than failings at relatively 
junior levels.84  In terms of positives, the definition of senior management was 
                                                          
75 Ibid. s. 9. 
76 Ibid. s. 10.  
77 For example, in the case of R v CAV Aerospace Ltd (unreported), Central Criminal 
Court, 31 July 2015 the company was ordered to pay £125,000 in prosecution costs. This 
is a significantly higher amount than a number of fines imposed in some of the corporate 
manslaughter cases before the new sentencing guidelines were introduced on 1 February 
2016.  
78 See Griffin, above n. 49.  
79 As Griffin ultimately concludes, ibid.  
80 See Ormerod and Taylor, above n. 4 at p 589. 
81 See House of Commons Home Affairs and Work and Pensions Committees, above n. 3.  
82 See for example comments of Griffin, above n. 49.  
83 See House of Commons Home Affairs and Work and Pensions Committees, above n. 3 
at para 132.  
84 See Home Office, above n. 27 at para. 28. 
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generally accepted by academicians 85   to be wider than the limited scope of 
persons who would be classed as the embodiment of the company under the 
identification doctrine. The move away from the need to identify a specific individual 
who was themselves guilty of manslaughter was also welcomed.  Gobert described 
this as a ‘major improvement’, noting that the definition of senior management 
referred to ‘persons’ rather than a single person suggesting an acceptance of ‘the 
concept of aggregation in limited form’.86 Whilst the approach adopted in the Act 
has its advantages over the narrower identification doctrine87, for many the reform 
did not go far enough as the following discussion illustrates.  
When the Bill was scrutinised by the Joint Committee, it was critical of the restriction 
of management failure to that of senior managers describing it as a ‘fundamental 
weakness’ which would ‘do little to address the problems that have plagued 
the…common law offence’. 88  Other critics agreed with this sentiment. Ormerod 
and Taylor argued that the test was ‘too restrictive’ and in that it would be necessary 
to identify specific individuals and the role they have within the organisation similar 
to when applying the identification doctrine.89 A number of other commentators 
raised similar concerns.90 Ireland noted corporate liability within the new offence 
was predicated on a finding of individual culpability in the senior management of 
the company as opposed to systemic failures alone.  He concluded the senior 
management test was progressive, albeit not a profound reform: “the Corporate 
Manslaughter Bill represents a liberalisation of the existing common law 
identification doctrine rather than a radical departure in approach”.91 
 
Additionally, whilst ‘senior management’ is a defined term, many noted that 
otherwise the concept was ‘low on definitions’92 and ‘vague’93.94 Despite calls to 
clarify the terminology used, we are ultimately left without guidance in the Act as to 
the interpretation of key words such as ‘substantial’ and ‘significant’. The word 
‘substantial’ is used three times and ‘significant’ once. Senior management must 
play a ‘substantial’ element in the breach and a person must play a ‘significant’ role 
in making decisions about, or manage, the whole or a ‘substantial part’ of the 
organisation’s activities to be classed as senior management. It was asserted that 
this lack of clarity would result in additional legal argument about which persons in 
                                                          
85 See for example the opinion of Ormerod and Taylor, above n. 4 at 60 and Gobert, 
above n. 39 at 428.  
86 Above n. 39 at 427. 
87 See Gobert, above n. 39 at p 428-429. 
88 Above n. 3 at para. 140.   
89 Above n. 4 at 604.  
90 See for example:  Clarkson, above n. 22; Trevelyan, above n. 46; D. Whyte, 'The fatal 
flaws in the English Corporate Manslaughter Bill' (2005) Employment Law Bulletin 4; N. 
Cavanagh, 'Corporate criminal liability: an assessment of the models of fault' (2011) 75 
Journal of Criminal Law 414; and Gobert, above n. 39.   
91 'Corporate liability - Ireland' (2006) Criminal Law Review 465 at 465. 
92 See Trevelyan, above at n. 46. 
93 See House of Commons Home Affairs and Work and Pensions Committees, above n. 3 
at 39.  
94 Most respondents to a consultation on the draft Bill found the definition of senior 
management too vague - see House of Commons Home Affairs and Work and Pensions 
Committees, above n. 3 at 145.  
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an organisation’s structure would be regarded as senior managers.95 The only 
advantage to be found in favour of  leaving such terms open to interpretation is that 
it may allow the courts ‘maximum flexibility’ when considering the circumstances of 
corporations on a case by case basis.96 
Ten years after the offence was implemented, we are now in the position to review 
the cases to date and see if the senior management test has proved to be as 
problematic as predicted. As of September 2017, there have been 25 corporate 
manslaughter convictions and a handful of acquittals or cases where charges have 
ultimately not been pursued. The senior management test has not generally been 
a central issue in the cases; nonetheless, we should not infer from this that the 
senior management test is unquestionably the ideal way to attribute liability on 
organisations. Arguably, the reason that the senior management test has not been 
a central issue in the cases to date is twofold. Firstly, in the majority of cases the 
defendant company has pleaded guilty meaning there was no requirement for 
analysis of which persons were the senior managers, and the meaning of terms like 
‘substantial’ and ‘significant’. Secondly, the convictions have overwhelmingly been 
of micro, small or occasionally medium sized organisations, the significant majority 
of which have lacked a complex management structure (discussed further below). 
Overall, the senior management test does appear to represent some improvement 
on the identification doctrine as there have already been 25 prosecutions under the 
Act, more than in total were prosecuted under the common law offence. It is very 
likely though that the inclusion of a senior management element to the offence 
deters prosecution of more complex cases. 
The judge’s comments in the case of Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust 
mentioned above give us an indication of how the courts might apply the senior 
management test to organisations with complex organisational structures. 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust was charged with corporate 
manslaughter in relation to the death of a woman following a caesarean section. 
Gross negligence manslaughter charges were also brought against two 
anaesthetists who attended to the woman.  The prosecution alleged that the 
treatment the deceased received was grossly negligent and questioned whether 
the Trust had employed unsuitably qualified anaesthetists. In order to come to a 
decision to dismiss the charge, the Honourable Mr Justice Coulson gave 
consideration as to who the senior management of the Trust were on the facts.  He 
suggested that the prosecution did not necessarily have to name the relevant senior 
managers involved in the breach, rather it should be required to identify the ‘tier’ of 
management that it considers to be the lowest level of senior management within 
the organisation that is culpable for the offence.  This would be contrary to the 
interpretation Ormerod and Taylor feared, whereby the prosecution would be 
required to identify and name specific individuals. The Honourable Mr Justice 
Coulson further noted that the prosecution would not be expected to ‘delve deep’ 
into labyrinthine management structures.  The comments were made specifically in 
                                                          
95 See House of Commons Home Affairs and Work and Pensions Committees, above n. 3 
at 40. 
96 As argued by in J.  Hughes and K.  Freeman, 'Corporate manslaughter – a new 
regime?' (2005) 16 5 Construction Law 20 at 4.  
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relation to a large NHS trust.  It is advanced that there is no reason the same 
approach could not be applied to other types of organisation. 
In conclusion, the senior management test does not appear to have been the 
overwhelming barrier to securing prosecutions that many experts feared. The high 
number of guilty pleas and predominance of prosecutions of SMEs have often 
meant that arguments about the senior management test are non-existent or not 
the crux of the case.  The senior management test does appear to be an 
improvement on the identification doctrine. Although we have had limited guidance 
from the courts on its interpretation and application,  the comments in Maidstone 
and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust are encouraging and might go some way to allay 
the fears of Ormerod and Taylor regarding a perceived necessity to identify specific 
individuals within an organisation’s structure.  Future judicial exploration of the 
concept is awaited with interest. 
A level playing field? 
As noted above, one of the objectives of the act was to create a level playing field 
for small, medium and large organisations. A concern about the senior 
management requirement was that it would apply inequitably to small and large 
organisations, replicating one of the main problems with the identification doctrine.97 
As the Act’s primary purpose was to target company offending, let us consider the 
position vis a vis companies.  Take, for example, a small company which has one 
main site of operation, the most senior people at the site will almost certainly be 
held to be senior managers who have responsibility for all or a substantial part of 
the company’s activities. At the other end of the spectrum, we might have a very 
large company with many factories, premises or sites of operation across the 
country. If a death occurs at any one of these sites, it is likely to be much harder to 
establish that the most senior persons at the relevant place were making decisions 
or managing a ‘substantial part’ of the organisation’s activities. The larger the 
company, the less ‘substantial’ any particular site of operations will be in the 
scheme of the organisation’s overall operations.98  
Commentators started to note the trend of prosecuting only small and medium 
companies around 2013/2014, and Field and Jones later went on to voice concern 
that the Act was ‘impotent’ against large companies99. This trend of prosecutions of 
small to medium sized companies has generally continued with the notable 
exception of the conviction of one large company, CAV Aerospace Ltd 100 
(discussed below in further detail). In fact, some of the convictions have been of 
very small, sole-director companies which could have been convicted under the old 
common law offence. Academics have generally been very critical of the lack of 
                                                          
97 See House of Commons Home Affairs and Work and Pensions Committees, above n. 3 
at 40.  
98 See discussion of this issue in House of Commons Home Affairs and Work and 
Pensions Committees, above n. 3 at para. 153.  
99 S.F. Jones and L. Field, 'Are directors getting away with manslaughter? Emerging 
trends in prosecutions for corporate manslaughter' (2014) Business Law Review 158 at 
163. 
100 R. v CAV Aerospace Ltd (unreported), Central Criminal Court, 31 July 2015.  
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prosecutions of large companies, criticism the author believes to be demonstrably 
unfair. Over 99% of businesses in the UK are small or medium sized (‘SMEs’), of 
which 96% are categorised as micro.101 Large companies account for only around 
1% of all UK businesses and are important in terms of the number of people they 
employ. However, SMEs still account for the majority of employment (60%) and 
employ more people than large companies.102 Further, the European Commission 
has estimated that 82% of occupational injuries and 90% of fatal accidents happen 
in SMEs.103  According to a report produced for the HSE, SMEs are often unable to 
employ dedicated health and safety staff, are sometimes unaware of their legal 
obligations, and may inadvertently expose their workers to risk in an attempt to 
maintain competitive pricing.104   When this information is taken into account, the 
fact that there has only been one prosecution of a large company is much less 
surprising. There are more SMEs than large companies, SMEs employ more 
people than large companies and fatalities are far more likely to be caused by SMEs 
than large companies. If only 10% of fatal accidents are caused by large companies, 
we could only have expected approximately two of the 25 companies convicted to 
date have been of large companies. The figure is admittedly less than that, but only 
by one.   
There have been some successful prosecutions of medium sized companies and 
one large company.   CAV Aerospace Ltd, the large company mentioned above, 
was a parent company which had a turnover of over £73 million and 460 employees.  
This prosecution involved a trial as opposed to a guilty plea, and exploration of 
collective management failings that led to the death of an employee who was 
crushed to death in a warehouse.  CAV Aerospace Ltd was fined £600,000, at the 
time the record highest fine in a corporate manslaughter case.  The fact that the 
Act can be utilised to prosecute a large company for corporate manslaughter is to 
be welcomed, although at present this case it is the only example. In the CAV 
Aerospace case there was email evidence sent to senior management which 
clearly proved they had repeatedly ignored clear and unequivocal warnings that 
practices at its subsidiary company’s premises were dangerous. In a prosecution 
of a large company where there is no such correspondence sent directly to senior 
management it would likely be much harder for the prosecution to establish to the 
criminal standard of proof that the senior management played a substantial element 
in the gross breach. 
Now we have had a conviction of a large company, accusations that the Act is 
impotent against large companies appear less tenable, particularly given that 
                                                          
101 House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper 06152 – Business Statistics (2016) at 3 
available at http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN06152/SN06152.pdf 
(accessed 3 May 2017).  
102 Ibid. at 5.  
103 Commission of the European Communities, Improving quality and productivity at work: 
Community strategy 2007-2012 on health and safety at work (2007) at 3. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/impact/ia_carried_out/docs/ia_2007/sec_2007_0216_en.pdf (accessed 3 May 
2017).  
104 Health and Safety Executive, Health and safety in the small to medium sized enterprise 
Psychosocial opportunities for intervention (2007) at 1 - see 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrpdf/rr578.pdf  (accessed 3 May 2017).  
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statistics suggest the majority of prosecutions should rightly be of SMEs. A better 
and undoubtedly valid criticism of the Act is that it has not created a level playing 
field for different types of organisation.  It remains to be seen whether the basis of 
liability created by the Act can be employed to convict a public body, such as Royal 
Borough of Kensington and Chelsea Council, rather than a company.  
 
Requirement to establish a duty of care 
The requirement for the organisation to owe a duty of care to the deceased was 
also controversial, and was not a requirement in earlier proposals for the offence.  
The earlier 1996 Draft Bill only required there to be management failure by the 
corporation which was the cause, or one of the causes, of death105  and this 
approach was cogently described by Clarkson as the ‘superior’ one.106  The Joint 
Committee was also critical of this aspect of the Bill. It described the inclusion of a 
civil law concept of duty care of care as ‘surplus to requirements and an 
‘unnecessary legal complication’107 suggesting that the duty of care concept should 
be removed from the Bill altogether.108   The difficulties of applying a civil law 
concept in criminal offences were also noted by a number of critics including 
Clarkson109, Trevelyan110, Ormerod and Taylor111 and bodies such as the Law 
Society112. These concerns were ultimately rejected, and the Act maintains the 
requirement to establish that the organisation owed a duty of care to the 
deceased.113 Despite the compelling arguments for removing the duty of care 
requirement, the concept does not appear to have been a particular issue in any of 
the cases to date. This is probably because nearly all the cases have involved 
deaths of employees working for the relevant organisation. It is well established 
that an employer owes a duty of care to an employee. Further, a duty of care to 
employees is one of the duties explicitly stated in the Act.114  The question of 
whether a duty of care exists is a question for the judge rather the jury, and judges 
are used to deciding question of law.   We will, therefore, have to wait for a case 
involving a more factually complicated relationship between organisation and 
deceased to ascertain whether concerns about the duty of care requirement were 
in fact well-founded.  
 
                                                          
105 See Law Commission, above n. 36 at 135.  
106 See Clarkson, above n. 22 at 683. 
107 Above n. 3 at 3.  
108 Ibid. at para. 105. 
109 Above n. 22.at 683.  
110 Above n. 46.  
111 Above n. 4 at 6-10.  
112 As noted by House of Commons Home Affairs and Work and Pensions Committees, 
above n.3 at para. 98.  
113 It should be noted that the Act does explicitly disapply the  tort rules of ex turpi causa 
non oritur actio and volenti non fit iniuria - The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate 
Homicide Act 2007,  s.2(6). 
114 The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, s. 2(1)(a).  
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Exclusion of individual liability and plea bargaining 
Another key criticism of the Act is that it missed an opportunity to maximise its 
potential deterrent effect by failing to include any element of individual liability.  No 
new criminal sanctions against individuals were imposed by the Act, and it was also 
decided to exclude secondary liability for persons who would otherwise be guilty of 
aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of the offence of 
corporate manslaughter.115 This is contrary to the usual position in criminal law 
where individual liability for accessories and abettors is the norm and immunity from 
liability the exception.116 In the report accompanying the draft Bill, the government 
stated that opinion had been strongly divided on the issue of individual liability.117 
Organisations representing workers and victims argued forcefully in favour, 
employers’ organisations had strongly opposed any form of individual liability.118  
In 2000, the Home Office had expressed concern that failing to provide punitive 
sanctions on company officers would not provide a meaningful level of deterrent, 
particularly in respect of large companies.119 In a similar vein, when the draft Bill 
was scrutinised by the Joint Committee it recommended secondary liability. 120  
Leading scholars like Wells had also advocated in the years preceding the Act that 
enforcement against companies is most effective when complemented by 
enforcement against senior managers121. This view was also shared by Clarkson 
who put it quite succinctly, ‘people are more amenable to deterrence than 
corporations’.122  
Ultimately, the government appears to have succumbed to industry pressure, 
justifying the exclusion of individual liability on the basis it was seeking to tackle the 
way the offence of manslaughter applies to organisations, not individuals.123 The 
Home Office had changed its mind, and argued that individual liability was already 
adequately provided for by the common law offence of gross negligence 
manslaughter.124 Whilst it is true that directors and managers can be charged with 
the common law offence, convictions are rare and often difficult. 125 In 2005, Whyte 
reported that some senior lawyers were arguing that the new offence might actually 
discourage individual prosecutions since the prosecuting authorities would be 
expected to bring a charge of corporate manslaughter instead.126  This concern 
appears to have been unfounded as charges have regularly been brought 
simultaneously against company and individual(s). A gross negligence 
                                                          
115 Ibid. s. 18. 
116 As Gobert notes, above n. 39 at 422.  
117 See Home Office, above n. 27 at para. 47.  
118 See Whyte, above n. 90 at 5.   
119 See Home Office, above n. 17 at para. 3.4.8.  
120 Above n. 3 at para. 309.  
121 See C. Wells, ‘Corporations: Culture, Risk and Criminal Liability’ [1993] Criminal Law 
Review 551 at 565 and C. Wells, ‘The Corporate Manslaughter Proposals: Pragmatism, 
Paradox and Peninsularity’ [1996] Criminal Law Review 545 at 553.  
122 Above n. 22 at 687.  
123 See Home Office, above n. 27 at para. 47.  
124 Ibid. at para. 48.  
125 Whyte suggested in 2005 that the rate was only around 3 or 4 a year. Above, n. 90 at 
6.  
126 Ibid.  
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manslaughter charge has been brought in less than half the cases though and 
actual convictions are still very rare.  The judge’s comments in the third case to be 
brought under the Act, Lion Steel Equipment Ltd127, may have deterred prosecutors 
from indicting directors. This case involved charges arising from the death of an 
employee who fell through the roof of an industrial unit whilst undertaking repair 
work. The company was charged with corporate manslaughter and two health and 
safety offences. The company pleaded guilty to the corporate manslaughter charge 
and received a fine of £480,000; the health and safety offences were left to lie on 
the file.  Three of the company’s directors were also charged with gross negligence 
manslaughter and health and safety offences. All the individual charges were either 
dismissed or not pursued in light of the company’s guilty plea.  In acquitting two of 
the directors of gross negligence manslaughter, the judge reiterated the high 
threshold required to secure a conviction for gross negligence manslaughter:  
prosecuting authorities in cases of gross negligence manslaughter 
alleged against individuals would be well advised to grapple with the 
height of the bar set by the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal; see 
R v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171, R v Singh (Gurphal) [1999] CLR 582, 
Misra [2004] EWCA Crim 2375 and Yaqoob [2005] EWCA Crim 2169.128   
A multitude of charges can be brought against both organisations and individuals 
in relation to the same death. The recent case of SR and RJ Brown129, which 
involved charges arising from the death of a worker who fell whilst working on a 
roof, is a good illustration. This case involved two companies (a contractor and a 
principal contractor) and charges were brought against both companies. SR and 
RJ Brown, the contractor, pleaded guilty to corporate manslaughter and various 
health and safety offences. The principal contractor was not charged with corporate 
manslaughter, pleading guilty instead to various health and safety offences. Two 
directors of SR and RJ Brown and one director of the principal contractor were 
imprisoned for health and safety offences and for perverting the course of justice. 
Another individual, a director of a third company, was convicted of perverting the 
course of justice. The convictions for perverting the course of justice are unusual in 
a corporate manslaughter case; nevertheless, the case illustrates the breadth of 
charges that a single fatality can spawn.   Collectively, the defendants pleaded 
guilty to 14 offences.  As Wells has noted, the plethora of potential charges that can 
arise from the same death lends itself to plea-bargaining. 130 A guilty plea on behalf 
of the company has sometimes led to the dropping of health and safety charges 
against the company.  Plea-bargaining has also proved a common way for 
individuals to escape liability, particularly in the earlier cases. By 2014 there had 
been enough cases for Wells to note an emerging pattern of ‘trade off’ where gross 
negligence and/or health and safety charges against directors were dropped in 
                                                          
127 R. v Lion Steel Equipment Ltd (unreported), Manchester Crown Court, 20 July 2012. 
128 Sentencing Remarks of HHJ Gilbart (QC) at para. 12 available at 
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Judgments/hhj-gilbart-
qc-sentence-remarksr-v-lion-steel.pdf  (accessed 28 April 2017).  
129 Health and Safety Executive v SR and RJ Brown (unreported), Manchester Crown 
Court, 16 March 2017.  
130 C. Wells 'Corporate criminal liability: a ten year review' (2014) Criminal Law Review 
849. 
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exchange for a corporate manslaughter guilty plea131. The dropping of individual 
charges and a potential reduction in the fine imposed appear to account for the 
reason why corporate defendants have entered so many guilty pleas.132 Guilty 
pleas have been entered in two-thirds of the cases where convictions have been 
secured. In SR and RJ Brown two gross negligence manslaughter charges were 
left to lie on the file, no doubt in exchange for the various other guilty pleas.  
Individual liability was a thorny issue at the consultation stage of the corporate 
manslaughter legislation and the Act does not appear to have resolved the problem. 
Simultaneous conviction of individuals for gross negligence manslaughter has not 
been the norm under the new regime, and plea bargaining has allowed a number 
of individuals to escape liability entirely when some would argue they should not 
have. More recent case law suggests the courts approach to individual liability may 
be changing (discussed further below). In future cases it may be more common to 
find individuals convicted along with a corporate offender.  
Public policy exemptions 
The offence applies to a wide range of organisations including Crown bodies, as 
noted above. Crown bodies were immune from prosecution for corporate 
manslaughter before the Act. The removal of crown immunity in the Act133 was 
widely welcomed134 and was consistent with the Government’s recognition of the 
need for public bodies to be accountable for failings leading to death135.  This is not 
the full picture though, as the Act includes a number of significant exceptions which 
will absolve public bodies of liability in a wide variety of circumstances.136 For 
example, liability is excluded in relation to decisions involving: the allocation of 
public resources or the weighing of competing public interests137; peacekeeping 
and terrorism operations138; and certain ‘exclusively public functions’139.  Clearly the 
inclusion of such exceptions was motivated by public policy and a recognition that 
such bodies are publicly funded, are intended to operate for the social good, and 
have competing pressures on their funds.  The exceptions in the Act are not so 
extensive as to effectively retain Crown immunity in all circumstances, yet no Crown 
body or government department has ever been found guilty of corporate 
manslaughter. All charges to date have been brought against companies, save for 
the one prosecution against Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust in which 
the judge dismissed the charge (discussed in further detail below). Whilst detailed 
analysis of this aspect of the Act is outside the scope of this article, it seems  
                                                          
131 Ibid. at 861.  
132 The New Sentencing Guidelines provide that the court should consider a potential 
reduction in the fine for a guilty plea. Sentencing Council, Health and Safety Offences, 
Corporate Manslaughter and Food Safety and Hygiene Offences Definitive Guideline 
(2016) at 27.  
133 By virtue of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, s. 11.  
134  See House of Commons Home Affairs and Work and Pensions Committees, above n. 
3 at para. 202.  
135 See Home Office, above 27 at para. 38.  
136 The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, s. 3-7.  
137 Ibid.  s. 3(1).  
138 Ibid. s. 4.  
139 Ibid. s. 3(2).  
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very unlikely that no government department or public body has committed 
corporate manslaughter in the last ten years.140  If prosecutors wish to maximise 
the deterrent effect of the offence, they should consider casting their prosecutory 
net wider.  
 
Requirement for consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions 
The consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions (‘DPP’) is required to bring a 
corporate manslaughter prosecution.141  The requirement for consent applies to 
both public and private prosecutions.142 This is contrary to the Law Commission’s 
initial proposals which suggested that there should be no such requirement in 
relation to private prosecutions.143 The government argued that significant concern 
had been raised amongst respondents to the consultation that removal of the 
requirement for DPP consent would lead to spurious prosecutions which would fail 
and lead to an unfair burden on organisations.144 This aspect of the draft Bill was 
also criticised by the Joint Committee although the restriction remains. 145  Gobert 
expressed concern that this requirement would lead to decisions becoming 
unacceptably caught up in politics and suggestions of withheld consent as a result 
of corporate lobbying of MPs: ‘those opposed to the decision may suspect that the 
DPP had been influenced by MPs who in turn had been influenced by corporate 
lobbyists….a shadow will have been cast over the integrity of the process.’146  The 
author is not aware of any reports that this has been in the case. In fact, following 
the Grenfell fire, we have seen Tottenham MP David Lammy, calling for 
prosecutions to be brought.  It is very likely that the number of prosecutions to date 
would have likely been higher without the requirement for DPP consent and any 
prosecution(s) in relation to Grenfell would of course have to overcome this 
potential restriction.  
 
Limited in scope to fatalities only/type of fatality 
The Act focuses on cases of death only. Support for extending the draft Bill to cover 
serious injuries was mixed.147 Clarkson advocated in favour of widening its scope 
to cover serious injuries as well as death.148 However, the author believes that the 
                                                          
140 For example, a significant number of people die each year in prison and at least some 
of these deaths could potentially be prosecuted. In the 12 months to June 2017, 97 
prisoners committed suicide and 2 were murdered – see 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/632625/saf
ety-in-custody-quarterly-bulletin-mar-2017.pdf (accessed 2 October 2017).  
141 The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, s. 17.  
142 See Gobert, above n. 39 at 429.  
143 See Law Commission, above n. 36 at para. 866. 
144 See Home Office, above n.27 at para. 60.  
145 Above n. 3 at 3.  
146 Above n. 39 at 431.  
147 As reported by House of Commons Home Affairs and Work and Pensions Committees, 
above n. 3 at paras. 75-80.  
148 Above n. 22 at 686.  
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Joint Committees’ view that amending the Draft Bill in this way would have caused 
the legislation to have ‘lost its clear focus’ was a correct one.149 Although Gobert 
was also of the view that focusing solely on fatalities had unduly restricted the scope 
of the Act150, the symbolic significance he speaks of would surely have been diluted 
if the offence had been widened to include anything other than deaths.  
In the HSE reporting period 2015/2016 there were 144 workers who were fatally 
injured at work (0.46 deaths per 100,000 workers).151 The number of deaths from 
occupational diseases is actually much higher than this, if more difficult to record 
with as much certainty.152  Each year it is estimated that there are around 13,000 
deaths from occupational lung disease and cancer which have been caused by past 
exposure to chemicals and dust at work.153 The Act was intended to cover these 
types of occupational deaths as well as fatal injuries and the Joint Committee were 
satisfied that the Bill was sufficiently wider to cover such deaths.154  All the cases 
to date have involved one-off incidents rather than cases of occupational disease. 
It has been highlighted that this can probably can be ascribed to other difficulties in 
bringing those types of cases, such as a lack of resources for gathering evidence.155 
The author contends that a strong deterrent from bringing these type of cases is 
the evidential problems they would raise. A death might happen after the Act’s 
commencement date albeit the exposure to harmful materials is likely to have 
occurred many years previously. As the Act is not retrospective, the judge in the 
Lion Steel Equipment case ruled that the Crown could not adduce evidence of 
activities which occurred before the Act’s commencement date save insofar as they 
were relevant to establishing a duty of care/gross breach of such duty after such 
commencement date.156 If a person dies in 2017 of mesothelioma because of 
exposure to asbestos while working for a company in the 1990s, the prosecution 
would not be able to adduce evidence of the company’s practices in the 1990s and 
any prosecution would fail.157 As time goes by it may be possible for prosecutions 
to be brought relating to exposure to harmful materials/death which occurred after 
the date of the Act’s commencement. Of course given improved safety practices, it 
is hoped that we would see a reduction in these types of deaths in future years. 
 
                                                          
149 See House of Commons Home Affairs and Work and Pensions Committees, above n. 
3 at para. 81.   
150 Above n. 39 at 2.  
151 See http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/pdf/fatalinjuries.pdf  (accessed 3 May 2017).  
152  Deaths from many occupational diseases can be caused by both occupational and 
non-occupational factors usually have to be estimated rather than counted. Ibid.  
153 See http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/pdf/fatalinjuries.pdf (accessed 2 May 2017).   
154 Above n. 3 at para. 84.  
155 See Joint Committee’s comments, above n. 3 at para. 83.  
156  R. v Lion Steel Equipment Ltd (unreported), Manchester Crown Court, 20 July 2012. 
See sentencing remarks, above, n. 128 at para. 8. 
157 The judge in Lion Steel stated that a prosecution could not be brought against a 
company for the common law offence either in these circumstances because the death 
occurred after the commencement date. See sentencing remarks, above, n. 128 at para 8. 
The judge also agreed with this view in the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells case although 
the comment appears to be obiter dictum.  
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The Prosecutions to Date 
If the government’s Regulatory Impact Assessment had proven correct, we should 
have had 100 - 130 corporate manslaughter prosecutions in the first ten years of 
the Act’s life. As at September 2017, there have only been 25 convictions, and a 
handful of acquittals and dismissals (see diagram 1 below). Even allowing for an 
expected lag between the Act’s introduction and the first convictions, the Act has 
not lived up to (actually quite modest) expectations in terms of case numbers.  
 
Overview 
 
There were no prosecutions in the first few years after the Act’s introduction, the 
first coming in 2011 with the successful prosecution of Cotswold Geotechnical 
Holdings Ltd.158 Cotswold was a small company with only eight employees and a 
sole director, under the New Sentencing Guidelines discussed below is would be 
classed as a micro organisation. Cotswold was convicted in relation to the death of 
an employee who was killed when a pit collapsed on him and received a fine of 
£385,000. This first case was followed by two convictions in both 2012 and 2013. 
In 2014, there were four convictions and also the first acquittals under the Act.159 A 
noticeable spike in prosecutions occurred in 2015 when nine companies were 
convicted. The trend of a year on year increase in cases ceased in 2016 though 
when there was only three convictions and there have been four convictions in 2017 
to date (arising out of three cases). We have already had more prosecutions and 
convictions than ever occurred under the old common law offence though.  In 2007, 
Griffin predicted that prosecutions would only be pursued in the most serious and 
obvious cases of gross negligence160 and this appears to be have been borne out 
in practice.   
To date there have been no Scottish cases and a higher number of Northern Irish 
cases than might have been expected given its relative population.161 Almond has 
observed that there has been a complete absence of cases in some areas and a 
concentration of cases in others, attributing this to “clusters of local expertise” 
in investigatory and prosecution teams which appears to be a valid assessment.162 
The majority of cases have involved workplace deaths and all the cases have 
involved one-off incidents as opposed to fatalities caused by industrial disease.  
Usually there has only been one death involved (with a few exceptions). The cases 
illustrate that there tends to be a number of years between the fatality in question 
occurring and any prosecution and trial. This is to be expected given the 
requirement for various agencies (police, HSE and Crown Prosecution Service) to 
work together, and the possibility of multiple charges being brought in respect of 
                                                          
158 R v Cotswold Geotechnical (Holdings) Ltd [2011] All ER (D) May 100.  
159 The acquittals were of R. v PS & JE Ward Ltd (unreported), Norwich Crown Court, 6 
June 6 2014 and R V MNS Mining Limited (2014) (unreported) Swansea Crown Court, 19 
June 2014.  
160 Above, n. 49 at 166.  
161 There have been four convictions of Northern Irish companies and two other cases 
where corporate manslaughter charges were initially brought but the relevant company 
was instead convicted of a health and safety offence.  
162 ‘Corporate Manslaughter: In Deep Water’, Health and Safety at Work, 18 August 2017.  
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the same death as noted above. The acquittals in the cases have generally resulted 
from an inability to convince the court that a gross breach occurred which caused 
the deceased to die.  
 
Diagram 1 
 
 
 
HSE statistics confirm that there has not been a significant decrease in the rate of 
worker deaths, the most often prosecuted type of case, so the question arises as 
to why there have not been more prosecutions, as predicted at the Act’s 
implementation.163 Grimes, a criminal lawyer specialising in business crime, has 
opined that the primary reason is a lack of expertise in investigatory teams, and the 
unfamiliarity of the police with incidents of this type:  
the health and safety subject matter experts [the HSE] are not the ones who 
review the evidence with a view to considering whether there’s a case of 
corporate manslaughter. That’s a bit of a structural weakness.164  
Slapper has posited similar constrictions, and in concurrence has noted that the 
small number of prosecutions is unlikely to be due to a lack of sufficiently 
reprehensible cases.165 A further hypothecation adduced by Slapper is that a lack 
                                                          
163 The HSE’s statistics indicate that that there was a slight reduction in the rate of worker 
deaths per 100,000 workers in 2008/2009 compared to previous years (a reduction from  
around 0.8 to 0.6) but since then the HSE has reported a levelling off of the rate which has 
only fluctuated marginally between 0.6 and 0.5 each year. See 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/index.htm (accessed 2 May 2017). 
164 ‘Police inexperience weakest link as just 25 convicted under corporate killing law’ 
Health and Safety at Work 12 June 2017. See also J. Grimes. ‘Corporate Manslaughter 
(2012) Law Society Gazette 29 Aug 2012. The Joint Committee also previously noted that 
the police might need further training in investigating and prosecuting the offence. Above, 
n. 3 at 327.   
165 G Slapper, 'Justice is mocked if an important law is unenforced' (2013) 77 Journal of 
Criminal Law 91 at 93.  
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of political appetite might be to blame.166 In 2012, it was reported that the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) had a significant number of cases in the pipeline. 167 
There was a spike in prosecutions in 2015 although this fell far short of the number 
of cases that might have been expected given the CPS report. In fact, as noted 
above, following 2015 there has been a decline in the number of cases. The CPS 
has, of course, had its budget cut168 and seen a reduction in the number of its 
staff169 and this may have affected its ability to prosecute this fairly niche area of 
law.  
 
Type and Size of Organisations Charged 
At the time the new offence was proposed the Government envisaged that most 
prosecutions would be against companies170 and this has proved to be the case 
with all other than one prosecution to date being of a company. A charge of 
corporate manslaughter was brought against Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS 
Health Trust as noted above, but the judge held there was no case to answer. 171 
Accepting that the deceased should not have died, the Honourable Mr Justice 
Coulson rejected the prosecution’s assertion that there were systematic failures at 
the Trust. He held that there was no evidence that any of the alleged breaches, 
even if they were gross, caused or contributed to the death of the deceased. Should 
the day eventually come when a public body is successfully prosecuted, it has been 
opined that fining an organisation which is taxpayer-funded is a somewhat pointless 
gesture.172 Others may disagree though, arguing that the state does not operate as 
single unit and that, as the vast majority of public bodies will have a finite pre-
determined budget, the threat of a fine can still be a powerful disincentive. Any 
potential impact on the provision of services is taken account of to a certain extent 
in the New Sentencing Guidelines. These provide that where the fine will fall on a 
public body, the fine should normally be substantially reduced if it would have a 
significant impact on its services. 173  As noted above, the vast majority of 
prosecutions have been of micro or small organisations.  
 
 
                                                          
166 Ibid.  
167 It was reported that the CPS had 56 ongoing cases in 2013. See 
https://www.pinsentmasons.com/en/media/press-releases/2013/new-corporate-
manslaughter-cases-opened-by-cps-up-40-in-20121/ (accessed 5 April 2017).  
168 See http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/annual_report_2015_16.pdf (accessed 3 
May 2017).  
169 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-35496012 (accessed 3 May 2017).  
170 I.e. those incorporated under the Companies Acts. See Home Office, above n. 17 at 
para. 3.4.1. 
171 Health and Safety Executive v Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust [2015] 
EWHC 2967 (QB).  
172 J. Harris, 'The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007: unfinished 
business?' (2007) 28 Company Lawyer 321 at 322.  
173 See Sentencing Council, above n. 132 at 26.  
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Fines – the highs and the lows 
Before the Act’s introduction, fines in corporate manslaughter cases under the old 
common law offence tended to be low, in the range of £4,000 to £90,000.174  The 
main sanction for corporate manslaughter under the Act has always been a fine 
with no upper limit. The majority of fines sentenced for the new offence have been 
above the pre-Act range. The average fine under the Original Sentencing 
Guidelines was £251,138. The average fine under the New Sentencing Guidelines 
is over double that amount, £528,571.175 The Original Sentencing Guidelines for 
corporate manslaughter came into effect in 2010, and followed a period of 
consultation. The Original Sentencing Guidelines stated that a fine for corporate 
manslaughter should seldom be less than £500,000, and could be measured in the 
millions of pounds. 176   There was a ten-stage process for sentencing, which 
included consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors, and the financial 
resources of the defendant. The court had the power to impose remedial orders, 
and publicity orders, in addition to any fine.  
In formulating the Original Sentencing Guidelines, the Sentencing Guidelines 
Council (predecessor body to the Sentencing Council) rejected a recommendation 
to link the amount of fine to an organisation’s turnover on the basis that the 
circumstances of defendant organisations, and the financial consequences of the 
fine would vary too much. 177 This was criticised at the time as a rejection of 
certainty in favour of judicial discretion178, and Slapper described the fine structure 
under the Original Sentencing Guidelines as ‘unnecessarily weak’. 179  Judicial 
discretion is all well and good, but the fines in the initial cases varied to such an 
extent it was impossible to discern a pattern. The majority were also below the 
recommended £500,000 level (see Diagram 2 below, conviction numbers 1 – 18 
relate to the period before the New Sentencing Guidelines were introduced). The 
lowest was in the case of Mobile Sweepers (Reading) Ltd in 2014. The company 
was charged with corporate manslaughter and two health and safety offences 
following the death of an employee who died from crush injuries while repairing a 
road-sweeping truck at a farm. The company pleaded guilty to the corporate 
manslaughter charge and the health and safety offences were left to lie on the file. 
The fine imposed on the company was arguably an insulting £8,000, albeit together 
with costs this amounted to all of the company’s assets 180 .  Judge Boney 
                                                          
174 N. Davies, ‘Sentencing guidance: Corporate Manslaughter and Health and Safety 
Offences Causing Death - Maintaining the Status Quo?’ [2010] 5 Criminal Law Review  
402 at 403.  
175 The average of the 25 sentences is £328,820.  
176 Sentencing Guidelines Council, Corporate Manslaughter & Health and Safety Offences 
Causing Death Definitive Guideline (2010) at para. 24. 
177 Ibid. at para 15 and Sentencing Advisory Panel, Advice to the Sentencing Guidelines 
Council, Sentencing for Corporate Manslaughter and Health and Safety Offences 
Involving Death (2009) at para.60.  
178 See Davies, above n 174 at 404.  
179 G. Slapper, 'Corporate punishment' (2010) 74 Journal of Criminal Law 181 at 182. 
180 R. v Mobile Sweepers (Reading) Ltd (unreported), Winchester Crown Court, 26 
February 2014. It should be noted that the company’s sole director was also fined 
£183,000 plus £8,000 in respect of health and safety breaches.  
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commented that the fine would have been much great, closer to £1 million, if the 
company had a larger turnover.  
By 2014, the fines imposed under the Original Sentencing Guidelines were coming 
under attack from commentators such as Field and Jones, and Wells.181 After the 
first 11 corporate manslaughter convictions, Field and Jones opined that the 
sentencing outcomes appeared to vary significantly, and that in a number of the 
cases the courts had been overly concerned with the financial health of the 
company rather than the interests of justice.182 The first corporate manslaughter 
case, Cotswold Geotechnical Holdings Ltd, confirmed from the outset that a fine 
which had the effect of putting a company out of business might be an acceptable 
consequence of a conviction, and the company was indeed subsequently dissolved. 
Both versions of the sentencing guidelines also clearly state that in some cases 
insolvency is an acceptable consequence.183 A number of companies have ceased 
trading or become insolvent following a fatality, both before and after conviction for 
corporate manslaughter. In general though, the courts often showed a reticence to 
push defendants into insolvency as Field and Jones note:  
in spite of the tough rhetoric and provision for ‘severe and punitive’ 
penalties, few fines could be said to conform to these criteria to date: the 
courts have tended to be more concerned with protecting the viability of 
the offending company.184 
The courts are also probably mindful that if a company becomes insolvent, any fine 
imposed is unlikely to be paid anyway. Some would argue this essentially defeats 
justice. 185 Such a view disregards the fact that the purpose of imposing a fine is not 
to raise revenue for the state, the purpose of a fine is to punish the offender, 
discourage offending, and to reflect the seriousness of the offence.186 A large fine 
that pushes a company into insolvency, even if ultimately never paid, could still 
meet these objectives.  
In November 2014, the Sentencing Council issued a consultation paper on 
sentencing for corporate manslaughter.187 The Sentencing Council noted that it was 
proposing to introduce an approach to sentencing for health and safety offences 
that would more closely link the means of the offender and the seriousness of the 
offence to the final sentence.188 Given the close relationship between health and 
safety offences and corporate manslaughter, it was thought necessary to review 
and update both sentencing guidelines at the same time to ensure a consistent 
                                                          
181 See Jones and Field, above n. 99 and Wells, above n. 130. 
182 L. Field and S.F. Jones, ‘The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 
2007 and the sentencing guidelines for corporate manslaughter: more bark than bite?’ 
(2015) 36The Company Lawyer 327 at 330.  
183 For the current version see Sentencing Council, above n. 132 at 26.  
184 Above n. 99 at 332.  
185 Gobert argued that individual liability would help address this issue, above n. 39 at 426. 
186 See Sentencing Council, above n. 132 at 25. 
187 Sentencing Council, Health and safety offences, corporate manslaughter and food 
safety and hygiene offences guidelines consultation (2014).  
188 Ibid. at 42. 
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approach.189   The Sentencing Council must have also been motivated by the 
widespread criticism that had been directed at the fines in the initial corporate 
manslaughter cases. Under the New Sentencing Guidelines, the multiple-step 
sentencing process is retained; the main change is that there is now a clearer link 
between the organisation’s turnover and the starting point for the fine. Firstly, the 
court has to determine whether there was a higher or lower level of culpability taking 
into account things such as how far short of the appropriate standard the defendant 
fell and whether there was more than one death.190 Where there is a higher level of 
culpability, the offence will be categorised as Category A. Where there was a lower 
level of culpability the offence will be categorised as Category B.  The court must 
then determine the size of the organisation (large, medium, small or micro) by 
reference to its turnover to work out the starting point for the fine and the fine range, 
see Table 1 below. 
Table 1 – Sentencing Guidelines as to fines191 
Size of 
Organisation        
Turnover Starting Point Category range 
Large 
Organisation 
More than £50 
million 
Category A - £7.5 
million 
 
 
 
Category B - £5 
million 
Category A - £4.8 
million - £20 
million 
 
 
Category B - £3 
million - £12.5 
million  
 
Medium 
organisation 
 
£10 million to £50 
million 
Category A - £3 
million 
 
 
Category B - £2 
million 
 
Category A - £1.8 
million - £7.5 
million  
 
Category B - £1.2 
million - £5 million  
Small 
Organisation 
 
£2 million to £10 
million 
 
Category A - 
£800,000 
 
 
Category B – 
£540,000 
 
Category A - 
£540,000 - £2.8 
million 
 
Category B - 
£350,000 – £2 
million 
Micro 
organisation 
Up to £2 million Category A - 
£450,000 
 
 
Category B - 
£300,000 
Category A - 
£270,000 - 
£800,000 
 
Category B - 
£180,000 - 
£540,000 
                                                          
189 Ibid.  
190 Above n 132 at 22.  
191 Ibid at 24.  
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The suggested starting points and range of fines set the expectation that there 
would be a very significant increase in the levels of fines in corporate manslaughter 
cases. It is worth noting that the suggested starting point for fines for large and 
medium sized organisations are both considerably in excess of £500,000, the 
benchmark under the Original Sentencing Guidelines. Even the starting point for a 
small organisation is significantly over £500,000 where the offence is Category A.  
For example, if CAV Aerospace Ltd had been sentenced under the New Sentencing 
Guidelines we might have expected a fine in excess of £20 million rather than 
£600,000.  
So what has happened since the New Sentencing Guidelines were introduced? 
Well the predictions of huge hikes in corporate manslaughter cases did not 
immediately come to pass. The first six sentences handed down under the New 
Sentencing Guidelines indicated that we could expect fines in future cases to be 
higher than they were before, but perhaps not as high as anticipated (see Diagram 
2 below, conviction numbers 19-24 relate to the first six sentences in the period 
after the New Sentencing Guidelines were introduced). The fine in all of these cases 
was within the range of fines imposed previously, although higher than the average 
fine imposed under the Original Sentencing Guidelines. Two defendants received 
a fine of £500,000192,  one defendant received a fine of £600,000193, the other three 
defendants received fines of £300,000194. At first glance, fines of £300,000 seem 
disappointingly low. It should be noted though that the three companies concerned 
were micro organisations and the fines fell within the relevant category range (see 
Table 1 above). They also all pleaded guilty which will have led to a reduction in the 
level of the fine.195 It has been observed that the £300,000 fine in the SR and RJ 
Brown case was high relative to the size of the offender and potentially indicative 
that the new guidelines may be resulting in larger fines than would previously have 
been the case.196 This contention is correct, notwithstanding, the court could have 
still been more punitive. The facts of the case indicated a high level of culpability, 
the company had no proper risk assessment or method statement for the work and 
there was an absence of safeguards that would have prevented the deceased 
falling to his death. Although the judge categorised the offence as category A, the 
fine imposed (even discounting the 25% reduction for the guilty plea) was still below 
the indicative starting point of £450,000 and well below the top of the category range 
(£800,000). The courts appeared to be prepared to be more punitive, just not as 
punitive as they possibly could, that is until a landmark sentence was passed. In 
July 2017 Martinisation (London) Ltd, a company with a turnover of £9.7 million was 
                                                          
192 R v Monavon Construction Ltd (unreported), Central Criminal Court, 27 June 2016 and 
Health and Safety Executive v Koseoglu Metal works Ltd (unreported) Chelmsford Crown 
Court, 19 May 2017.  
193 R. v Bilston Skips Ltd (unreported), Wolverhampton Crown Court, 16 August 2016. 
194 Health and Safety Executive v Sherwood Rise Ltd (unreported), Nottingham Crown 
Court, 5 February 201; Health and Safety Executive v Koseoglu Metal works Ltd 
(unreported) Chelmsford Crown Court, 19 May 2017; Health and Safety Executive v SR 
and RJ Brown (unreported), Manchester Crown Court, 16 March 2017. 
195 For example, the fine in Health and Safety Executive v SR and RJ Brown (unreported), 
Manchester Crown Court, 16 March 2017 was reduced by 25% to reflect the guilty plea.  
196 459 Health and Safety Bulletin 9.  
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fined £1.2 million in relation to the deaths of two employees who fell from a first 
floor balcony as they tried to hoist a sofa up from the pavement. 197 This is the first 
time a fine measured in the millions of pounds has been imposed, the previous 
largest sanction was £700,000 against Baldwins Crane Hire Ltd, a medium sized 
company with a turnover of £22 million. 198   Martinisation (London) Ltd was 
categorised as a small organisation (although it was only just below the turnover 
threshold to be classed as a medium organisation) and the judge viewed the level 
of culpability as high and therefore both corporate manslaughter offences were 
Category A. The company had a poor health and safety track record, having 
received a number of enforcement notices from the HSE in the past, and had 
ignored advice to hire specialist equipment at a cost of £848 to lift the sofa.  Despite 
the company already being in liquidation, the court was prepared to impose a fine 
significantly in excess of all preceding corporate manslaughter fines. The fine was 
well above the £800,000 starting point and within the fine range for a category A 
offence (£540,000 - £2.8 million).  The court also imposed a publicity order and one 
of the company’s two directors was jailed for health and safety offences. The 
adherence of the court to the principles in the New Sentencing Guidelines and the 
imposition of a fine which is reflective of the gravity of the crimes committed in the 
Martinisation (London) Ltd case is to be commended. This case is the clearest 
indication since the introduction of the New Sentencing Guidelines of a paradigm 
shift in the sentencing of corporate manslaughter cases. 
There were some concerns raised about the potential hike in fines for corporate 
manslaughter under the New Sentencing Guidelines. Forlin queried whether it 
might cause very large organisations to consider relocating out of the jurisdiction.199 
It is postulated that this is unlikely. The costs and inconvenience of relocating are 
always going to hugely outweigh the low risk of prosecution, something such 
companies would be aware of from their advisors. Other concerns raised by Forlin 
though, such as the spectre of more contested, lengthier and complex trials, may 
yet prove to be valid.200 Early indications based on the recent cases suggest a 
significant proportion of defendants will continue to plead guilty. Field and Jones 
have also noted that there may be difficulties in ensuring the courts apply the New 
Sentencing Guidelines correctly. They argue that it will be a challenge for the courts 
to analyse detailed accounts and financial reports and to understand potentially 
complex group structures in order to categorise an organisation’s size.201 Again, we 
will have to wait and see if this proves to be the case.  
                                                          
197 Health and Safety Executive v Martinisation (London) Ltd (unreported), Central 
Criminal Court, 19 May 2017. Note that some reports have suggested the company was 
fined £2.4 million i.e. £1.2 million per count of corporate manslaughter. This is technically 
correct but as the sentences were to run concurrently, the total amount the company must 
pay is £1.2 million – 462 Health and Safety Bulletin 6.  
198 Health and Safety Executive v Baldwins Crane Hire Ltd (unreported), Preston Crown 
Court, 22 December 2015.  
199 G. Forlin, 'The Sentencing Council consultation document relating to health and safety 
offences, corporate manslaughter and food safety and hygiene offence guidelines: "up up 
and away"!' (2015)1 Archbold Review 6 at 6.  
200 Ibid.  
201 Above n. 182 at 332.  
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The New Sentencing Guidelines represent a significant step forward and should 
help to ensure greater uniformity in corporate manslaughter sentencing. Despite 
this, it is still difficult to predict with accuracy the level of fine that will be meted out 
in any particular case. The cases sentenced under the New Sentencing Guidelines 
thus far suggest we can expect significantly higher average fines in the future than 
we have seen in the past, sentences which better reflect the severity of the crime 
committed. Of course, if prosecutions continue to principally be brought against 
micro and small organisations we are unlikely to see million pound fines being 
routinely imposed. The New Sentencing Guidelines were not intended, and would 
have been the inappropriate vehicle, to address any perceived lack of prosecutions 
of large companies.   
Diagram 2 – Fines in Corporate Manslaughter cases under the Act202 
 
                                                          
202 Note that the fine in R v Prince’s Sporting Club Ltd (unreported), Southwark Crown 
Court, 22 November 2013 has variously been reported as £134,579 or £34,579 with costs 
of £100,000. The CPS publicity states the fine was £134,579: 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/latest_news/london_sports_club_sentenced_for_corporate_m
anslaughter/ (accessed 28 April 2017).  
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Remedial, Publicity and Compensation Orders 
As noted above, the court has the power to make a remedial order in corporate 
manslaughter cases. This is in addition to the power of the HSE and local authorities 
already have to require improvements and such bodies are likely to intervene much 
quicker than a court could.203 It was acknowledged by the Joint Committee that 
remedial orders would be rarely used in practice,204 and to date no remedial order 
has been made in any of the cases.  
The possibility of a publicity order is clearly designed to act as another deterrent to 
lax health and safety practices. A publicity order may potentially be more damaging 
than a fine as it has reputational implications and it has been articulated that it could 
also affect share prices and lead to higher insurance premiums.205 Ormerod and 
Taylor contended that large organisations might be more concerned about adverse 
publicity than a fine.206   Publicity orders have only been made against eight207 of 
the 25 successfully prosecuted companies which have been sentenced despite 
both versions of the sentencing guidelines confirming that a publicity order should 
ordinarily be imposed.208 Corporate manslaughter cases tend to attract significant 
media coverage and a publicity order may be viewed as achieving little where 
information has already been circulated in the public domain. This may be one of 
the reasons publicity orders have not been made routinely.  It has been argued that 
a publicity order may present the facts in a more balanced way than the press might 
otherwise209  and they may help to ensure accuracy of reporting. On a number of 
occasions there has been inconsistent reporting of the level of fine imposed in a 
corporate manslaughter case. For example, most of the reporting on the recent 
Martinisation (London) Ltd case correctly stated that the fine payable was £1.2 
million. However, other articles in the construction press gave the impression that 
the company was ordered to pay £2.4 million in respect of the two counts of 
corporate manslaughter and £650,000 for a health and safety breach i.e. over £3 
million in total.210 The company was ordered to pay £1.2 million in total because the 
                                                          
203 See House of Commons Home Affairs and Work and Pensions Committees, above n. 
3 at para. 273.  
204 Ibid.   
205 'Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007' (2008) IDS Employment 
Law Brief 14.  
206 Above n. 4 at 610.  
207 R v Prince’s Sporting Club Ltd (unreported), Southwark Crown Court, 22 November 
2013; R. v Mobile Sweepers (Reading) Ltd (unreported), Winchester Crown Court, 26 
February 2014; Health and Safety Executive v Peter Mawson Ltd (unreported), Preston 
Crown Court, 3 February 2015; Health and Safety Executive v Linley Developments Ltd 
(unreported), St Albans Crown Court, 24 September 2015; Health and Safety Executive v 
Baldwins Crane Hire Ltd (unreported), Preston Crown Court, 22 December 2015; Health 
and Safety Executive v Cheshire Gates & Automation Ltd (unreported), Manchester 
Crown Court, 17 November 2015; Health and Safety Executive v SR and RJ Brown 
(unreported), Manchester Crown Court, 16 March 2017;  Health and Safety Executive v 
Martinisation (London) Ltd (unreported), Central Criminal Court, 19 May 2017.  
208 See Sentencing Council, above n. 132 at 27 for current guidelines.   
209 B. Barrett, 'Liability for safety offences: is the law still fatally flawed?' (2008) 37(1) 
Industrial Law Journal 100 at 113.  
210 See for example: http://www.theconstructionindex.co.uk/news/view/construction-boss-
jailed-after-balcony-fall-deaths (accessed 3 October 2017) and https://www.barbour-
ehs.com/tag/construction (accessed 3 October 2017).  
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sentences were concurrent. In order to ensure that reporting is balanced, factually 
accurate and not misleading in any way, publicity orders should be routinely 
imposed in accordance with the provisions of the New Sentencing Guidelines. 
The court also has the ability to consider making a compensation order. The New 
Sentencing Guidelines acknowledge that the assessment of compensation in cases 
involving death will usually be complex and will ordinarily be covered by 
insurance.211 It is anticipated that in the majority of cases the court will conclude 
that compensation should be left to the civil courts. A compensation order has not 
been made in any of the cases to date.  
Concurrent health and safety proceedings against the organisation   
As noted above, the Act is intended to complement rather than replace existing 
health and safety law. When a corporate manslaughter prosecution is pursued, a 
health and safety charge(s) is also usually brought in the majority of cases. In a 
significant number of the cases, health and safety charges have been left to lie on 
file though when a company has pleaded guilty to corporate manslaughter. This 
means that a defendant has been simultaneously convicted of both corporate 
manslaughter and a health and safety offence in less than half of the cases.  
Concurrent proceedings against individuals – gross negligence manslaughter, 
health and safety and director disqualification 
In the 25 instances where a company has been convicted of corporate 
manslaughter, it is notable that an individual has simultaneously been convicted of 
gross negligence manslaughter only twice.212 This means should a company be 
convicted of corporate manslaughter there is less than a one in ten chance of any 
individual been convicted of gross negligence manslaughter. Although many more 
gross negligence charges have been brought in the cases, ultimately, the 
individuals have been acquitted or the prosecution has decided not to pursue the 
charge.213 Individuals could, and still can, also be charged with health and safety 
offences 214  or be disqualified as a director (where relevant) 215 . In corporate 
manslaughter cases under the Act, disqualifications have occurred in only six 
                                                          
211 See Sentencing Council, above n. 132 at 28.  
212 R. v Bilston Skips Ltd (unreported), Wolverhampton Crown Court, 16 August 2016 and 
Health and Safety Executive v Sherwood Rise Ltd (unreported), Nottingham Crown Court, 
5 February 2016.  
213 Anecdotal evidence from those practicing in the area suggest that corporate 
manslaughter charges are commonly considered following a fatality but the organisation is 
often ultimately indicted on health and safety charges only. 
214 Usually under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 s. 37. 
215 In accordance with the provisions of the Director Disqualification Act 1986.  
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cases216 and an individual has been convicted of a health and safety offence in 
ten217.  
It is questionable whether the pre-existing law, particularly gross negligence 
manslaughter, was in fact adequate given how infrequently it is being successfully 
employed. Field and Jones have even gone as far as to suggest that individuals 
are less likely to be convicted with their companies under the Act than they were 
under the old common law: ‘the current picture would suggest that directors are in 
fact escaping prosecution, and thus being treated more leniently than was the case 
prior to the [Act].’ 218  Individual(s) have only received some form of personal 
sanction in 40% of the cases to date. It should be noted that a significant proportion 
of cases where individuals have also been sanctioned have occurred after the 
introduction of the New Sentencing Guidelines.  All except one case post February 
2016 has involved simultaneous conviction of a director(s) for an offence. This may 
denote a tougher approach towards individuals in the future along with higher fines 
for organisations.  
Conclusions 
Creating a new statutory offence of corporate manslaughter was always going to 
be challenging. Various points of law were hotly debated in the long period of 
consultation before the Act was introduced, and respondents did not always agree 
about how the criminal law should be applied in corporate manslaughter cases. This 
article has investigated and brought fresh insight into this still evolving area of law 
through: analysis of the Act’s perceived weaknesses; scrutiny of the extent to which 
the Act has been successful in meeting its stated aims; exploration of the judicial 
precepts in this area; and consideration of what the future holds for corporate 
manslaughter.  
Whether the criticism of ten years ago has proved to be well founded 
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The melding together of company law and criminal law in the Act, two usually 
distinct and complex areas of law in their own right, unsurprisingly provoked much 
debate and comment at the time. Later commentators have paid little regard to this 
useful body of literature so the author has used it to aid her critical interpretation of 
the Act’s performance in practice over the last ten years. Surprisingly, questioned 
elements of the offence like the requirement to establish a duty of care and the 
senior management test have not proved to be central issues in the cases to date. 
It must be conceded that without the requirement for senior management 
involvement, it is very likely we would have seen a higher volume of cases 
prosecuted to date. However, in relation to the cases which have been prosecuted, 
the senior management test does not appear to have been the overwhelming barrier 
to securing prosecutions that many experts feared, and, whilst a flawed mechanism 
for attributing liability, it certainly represents an improvement on the identification 
doctrine. We await with interest a case that will further explore the relatively liberal 
interpretation of the senior management test posited in the recent case of 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust. The Act has outperformed its critics on 
certain issues. On the other hand, unease about other aspects of the offence, such 
as the requirement for DPP consent, wide-ranging public policy exemptions and the 
exclusion of individual liability do appear to have had a negative impact on the Act’s 
effectiveness as predicted. If the Act had provided for some form of individual 
liability (which was mooted and ultimately rejected) it would undoubtedly have a 
greater potential deterrent and have been more efficacious.   
Has the Act been successful in meeting its stated aims?  
The Act has not been the failure some experts predicted, but it occupies a statutory 
‘middle ground’ in many respects. The government was seeking to balance the 
health and safety of workers and the public against the concerns of industry.   This 
compromised approach has led to compromised results. We have seen an increase 
in the number of corporate manslaughter convictions and higher average fines 
being imposed.  There have also been some convictions of medium companies and 
one large company, something that would have been almost unimaginable under 
the old law because of the restrictive identification doctrine. At times, the Act has 
been met with unwarranted criticism due to a perceived failure to prosecute enough 
large companies. Health and safety statistics suggest that large companies are 
responsible for relatively few fatalities and that it is in fact reasonable to expect the 
majority of prosecutions should be of SMEs. Bearing this in mind, the fact that there 
has only been one conviction of a large company does not mean that the Act has 
been unsuccessful in meeting its aim of creating a level playing field for 
organisations of different sizes, at least in respect of companies.  Conversely, the 
reform was not as radical as many hoped.  
The number of prosecutions each year has fallen short of what was projected and 
the Act has not yet realised its full potential in other ways as well. Only companies 
have been convicted of the new offence despite the wide spectrum of entities 
capable of committing the offence. The Act must rightly be accused of not creating 
an even playing field for different types of organisation: prosecutions have almost 
been entirely company centric. Neither have any of the cases to date concerned 
long-term fatal damage to health, and it remains to be seen whether the Act could 
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be used to prosecute an organisation which has caused a multi-fatality disaster of 
the type the Act was intended to address. The Act did not attempt to impose 
individual liability, nonetheless it is impossible to entirely separate the issue of 
individual culpability from corporate liability. In order to secure corporate 
manslaughter convictions prosecutors have often been willing to drop individual 
charges against directors and managers.  We therefore have a position where, 
more often than not, directors and managers are not also held personally 
accountable.  This has no doubt had an impact on the Act’s deterrent effect, 
although early indications are that that the courts may now be more willing to 
sanction individuals following the introduction of the New Sentencing Guidelines. 
The Act is neither a failure nor a resounding success, as it has only been partially 
capable of meeting its aims. As it is still a relatively new offence, it is possible that 
the Act may fulfil all its aspirations in due course. Clearly much more proactivity in 
prosecution would be required for all the offence’s ambitions to come to fruition.   
The case law – commonalities and identifiable trends 
A detailed review of the cases has confirmed that the Act is a more potent tool for 
prosecuting corporate manslaughter than the common law gross negligence 
manslaughter offence despite its flaws. There have been a small number of 
acquittals or dismissals, yet the majority of prosecutions have led to conviction. 
Approximately two-thirds of defendants have pleaded guilty which indicates a belief 
amongst defendants (or their advisors) that the Act has teeth and that they are more 
likely than not to be convicted on trial. Average fines under the new regime have 
generally been consistently higher than under the old regime. Consistency in 
sentencing has proved to be more problematic. Organisations cannot be 
incarcerated and, therefore, a fine is usually accepted as the most appropriate 
penalty for corporate offences. The problem is that whilst an individual who is 
convicted of as crime can be incarcerated regardless of whether they are rich or 
poor, an organisation’s ability to pay a fine is inextricably linked to its financial 
position.  Bearing this in mind, judges have often found it hard to impose fines that 
reflect the seriousness of the offence and which are consistent with the fines 
imposed in other cases and the principles of sentencing. The New Sentencing 
Guidelines, which link the starting point for a fine with an organisation’s turnover, 
appear to have gone a significant way to answer these concerns. The recent cases 
sentenced pursuant to them give the impression that we can expect consistently 
higher average fines in future cases. If a company is charged with corporate 
manslaughter it is more likely than not that it will also be charged with a health and 
safety offence, albeit such charges are not always ultimately pursued. Publicity 
orders have only been made a small number of times and the court has never made 
a compensation order.   
Plea bargaining has been a clear trend, especially in the earlier cases. It will be 
interesting to see if this is something which continues in the post New Sentencing 
Guidelines regime or if a tougher stance will be adopted along with potentially higher 
fines and a greater appetite for convicting individuals simultaneously. Convictions 
of individuals for gross negligence manslaughter are rare under the new regime, 
although the initial filing of charges is far more common. Disqualification as a 
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director has occurred in only 20% of the cases and individuals have been convicted 
of health and safety in only 40% of the cases.  
In summary, based on the prosecutions over the last ten years, if an organisation 
is involved a fatality it is still statistically unlikely that it will be charged with corporate 
manslaughter, especially if it is not a limited company. The organisation is more 
likely to ‘just’ face a health and safety prosecution.  If a defendant is charged with 
corporate manslaughter though, it will more likely than not be convicted. If a 
corporate manslaughter charge is brought, it is very likely health and safety charges 
will also be brought against the organisation, although there is only around a 50% 
chance of the defendant being convicted of both corporate manslaughter and a 
health and safety offence. Following the introduction of the New Sentencing 
Guidelines, organisations can now expect higher fines than they could previously. 
It would still be quite difficult to predict with accuracy the level of fine that would be 
imposed in any particular case. A guilty plea on behalf of the company is likely to 
result in a reduction of the level of the fine and possibly other charges against the 
company and/or individuals being dropped, although the courts may not be as 
willing to do this in the future as they have been in the past. Whilst a possibility, it is 
unlikely that a publicity order will be imposed, in any event the incident is likely to 
attract adverse publicity in both the national and trade press. A compensation order 
and/or remedial order almost certainly will not be made.    
If an organisation is charged with corporate manslaughter, it is quite likely that an 
individual, usually a director, will be charged with either breaching health and safety 
law or gross negligence manslaughter. There is a disconnect between charging and 
prosecution – the former being far more common than the latter. Gross negligence 
manslaughter convictions are still rare. Health and safety convictions are more 
frequent, but have still only occurred in less than half the cases. There is the 
possibility of director disqualification (where relevant), again fairly unlikely. In the 
past, it was more likely than not, that no individual would be sanctioned at all. 
Analysis of cases post February 2016, when the New Sentencing Guidelines 
became effective, has revealed a new vigour for holdings individuals to account 
along with their companies. Future cases are awaited with interest to see if this 
trend continues.  
The future of corporate manslaughter 
Revisions to the sentencing guidelines appear to have provoked a noticeable 
increase in the level of fines imposed for the offence and the courts have recently 
demonstrated an increased appetite to convict individuals alongside their 
companies.  In isolation, these things are not enough to facilitate the Act to realise 
its full potential. The Act is being prosecuted, just not as effectively or fully as it 
could. The type of prosecutions being brought under the Act are fairly narrow in 
respect of the type of organisation, victim and injury. Given the very significant 
amount of time it took for the Act to be passed in the first place, and how much 
political time Brexit is likely to consume, it seems unlikely any government would 
have the appetite to embark on another round of consultation with a view to make 
substantive amendment to the Act itself. Prosecutor training is a more realistic 
option. Unless prosecutors are prepared to cast their net more widely in the future, 
37 
 
we are likely to continue to see little variety in the type of organisations prosecuted, 
and the nature of the fatalities involved. The wider the prosecution net the more 
successful the Act will be in its aim discouraging negligent health and safety 
practices. Once an organisation is found guilty, judges should be prepared to set 
fines which are within the relevant guideline parameters and which reflect the 
sentencing objectives as the court did in the recent case of Martinisation (London) 
Limited. Any fine imposed should meet the objective of punishment, encourage a 
reduction in offending, and reflect the seriousness of the offence even if this does 
sometimes mean the company will become insolvent. Publicity orders should be 
made in every case to avoid inconsistencies in reporting.  
The Act and the cases prosecuted under it have attracted widespread publicity in 
the local, national and trade press. This has to be helpful in reminding organisations 
and their managers about the importance of good health and safety practices yet 
we still have a long way to go. Preventing unnecessary deaths is still as relevant 
today as it was when the Act was introduced. In 2015/2016, 144 people died at work 
in Great Britain219 and the significant loss of life suffered in the Grenfell Tower fire 
is a tragic reminder that health and safety is not just a workplace issue. Incidents 
like this could and should be preventable. The chances of any organisation being 
convicted of corporate manslaughter in relation to any death is only very marginally 
higher than it was under the common law.  Grenfell Tower will likely become the 
most significant test of the Act to date. In order to secure a conviction a 
reconceptualisation of the meaning of ‘offender’, as argued above, may be required.  
Can the Act successfully prosecute an organisation which has caused a multi-
fatality disaster of the type it was enacted to confront? Without enhanced training, 
will the multi-agency investigatory and prosecution team be able to build a cogent 
case from the overwhelming amount of complex evidence it is in the process of 
gathering? If no corporate manslaughter prosecution(s) are brought, the Act will be 
regarded as a failure; if prosecution(s) are brought and fail, the Act will be regarded 
as a failure. Ten years after the Act was introduced, we have come a long way, 
nevertheless there is still further to go. Arguably, the picture is one of progress, but 
we owe it to the many people who die unnecessarily each year, like those who died 
in the Grenfell blaze, to strive for nothing less than perfection. 
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